FCA Enforcement & Compliance Digest — Fall 2024 False Claims Act Newsletter

In this Fall 2024 edition, we cover:

1. Enforcement Trends: Manufacturers challenge AKS intent requirement as reflected in recent denials of OIG Advisory Opinion requests.
2. Litigation Developments: Implications of Florida judge’s ruling that the FCA qui tam provision is unconstitutional.
3. Compliance Corner: What health care companies need to know about AI.
4. ICYMI: Federal Court Permits Investors to Resume Kickback Suit Against Teva

1. Enforcement Trends

Do Violations of the AKS Require a ‘Corrupt’ Intent? Manufacturers Challenge the OIG’s Interpretation of the Statute

In a series of recent lawsuits filed by the pharmaceutical industry against the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), manufactures are challenging the OIG’s interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Statue (AKS), arguing that violations of the statute require a corrupt intent. While courts have so far ruled in OIG’s favor, should a court accept this argument, the AKS regulatory landscape could be upended, providing health care providers and suppliers the opportunity to develop and implement arrangements that have historically been prohibited by the OIG.

The challenges to OIG’s interpretation of the AKS come in the context of OIG Advisory Opinion requests submitted by the manufacturers (or a related charity) proposing various forms of patient assistance programs under which the manufacturers or their related charities offer financial assistance to patients on the manufacturers’ products. The OIG denied each of the Advisory Opinion requests, finding that the proposed forms of patient assistance would constitute remuneration intended to induce patients to purchase the manufacturers’ drugs in violation of the AKS.

The OIG has consistently reiterated its opposition to manufacturer-operated patient assistance programs, with both the OIG’s 2005 Special Advisory Bulletin: Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees and the 2014 Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance Programs noting that manufacturers cannot provide co-pay assistance to federal health care program beneficiaries, as doing so would constitute a kickback. However, the guidance also described the parameters under which independent charities can provide co-pay assistance, including assistance to federal health care program beneficiaries (i.e., Medicare beneficiaries). One of the key factors with respect to the operation of charitable patient assistance programs, is the independence of the charities operating the programs. While the independent charities are primarily funded by manufacturers, to be considered independent for OIG’s purposes, the charities must retain independence from donors. This means the donors cannot influence the design or operation of the patient assistance programs, and the programs cannot favor patients on the donor’s drug (e.g., assistance cannot be contingent upon the patient being prescribed a donor’s drug).

In three separate litigations, Pfizer Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, Vertex Pharmaceuticals Incorporated v. United States Department of Health and Human Services et al., and Pharmaceutical Coalition for Patient Access v. United States of America et al., manufacturers are challenging OIG’s long-held position that manufacturers cannot provide patient assistance, including co-pay assistance, to federal health care program beneficiaries. In doing so, the goal of the manufacturers is to provide assistance to patients, including co-pay support, either directly or through a charity that is not considered independent by OIG’s standards due to the relationship of the proposed charities to the manufactures and the level of influence by the manufacturers over the proposed charities. In each litigation, the manufacturer or, in the case of the Pharmaceutical Coalition for Patient Access (PCPA), the charity controlled by the manufacturers, is challenging an unfavorable Advisory Opinion issued by OIG concluding that the proposed patient assistance programs would constitute remuneration intended to induce patients to use a particular manufacturer’s products.

Under the arrangements proposed by Pfizer and PCPA, the proposed charities would be funded exclusively by manufacturers and would only provide support to patients on those funders’ drugs. In Pfizer’s Advisory Opinion request, the company proposed two potential co-pay assistance programs: (1) a direct co-pay assistance program and (2) a Pfizer-supported charity co-pay assistance program. Similar to the proposed Pfizer-supported charity co-pay assistance program, PCPA, an organization funded by manufacturers of Part-D-covered oncology drugs, proposed to create its own patient assistance program that would provide co-pay assistance to patients who meet certain qualifying criteria and then invoice each participating manufacturer for “the total amount of cost-sharing subsidies provided to eligible Part D enrollees.”

Vertex’s Advisory Opinion request focused on a proposed “Fertility Preservation Program” under which Vertex would pay fertility providers through a third-party vendor for the treatments provided to patients enrolled in the program. While this proposed program involved coverage of related treatment costs (i.e., the costs of the fertility treatments) rather than coverage of the co-pay costs associated with the Vertex drug itself, OIG nonetheless applied the same reasoning as in the Pfizer and PCPA opinions, concluding that the program would constitute remuneration to the patients in violation of the AKS.

In each litigation, the manufacturer (or, in the case of PCPA, the manufacturer-related charity) is challenging OIG’s position that the manufacturer’s subsidies constitute “remuneration” meant “to induce” patients to purchase manufactures’ products. The manufacturers argue that the AKS criminalizes conduct that “leads or tempts to the commission of crime” through “remuneration” that corrupts medical decision-making, as part of a quid pro quo transaction. In other words, according to the manufacturers, “to induce” requires a corrupt intent. Therefore, because the manufactures’ efforts to assist patients with meeting Medicare co-pay obligations or gaining access to Medicare-covered treatments (or treatments otherwise covered by the federal health care programs) are not done with malice or corrupt intent, such programs would not violate the AKS.

To date, no court has agreed with the manufacturers’ position. While Vertex is still pending trial in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled against Pfizer, noting that “the law is clear that absent an express carve-out, the Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits any remuneration intended to induce someone to purchase or receive a drug or medical service.” Similarly, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled against PCPA, concluding that HHS OIG’s “interpretation of the AKS adheres faithfully [to] the statute’s plain text, comports with its context, and does not offend its history.” On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision in Pfizer, finding that an AKS violation does not require “corrupt intent.” Pfizer then appealed to the US Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. PCPA’s case is currently on appeal with the Fourth Circuit.

Should the Vertex court or a court of appeals agree that the statutory terms “induce” and “remuneration” should be construed more narrowly and require a corrupt intent to violate the AKS, AKS regulatory interpretation and much of OIG’s guidance could be called into question. Arrangements that have historically been viewed as suspect by the OIG could be considered compliant to the extent the parties lacked a corrupt intent to violate the law.

And the Fox Says… Ongoing efforts challenging OIG’s statutory interpretation of the AKS demonstrate manufacturers’ interests in narrowing the scope of prohibited activities under the law. Providers and suppliers should continue monitoring the ongoing litigation and any future efforts to challenge OIG’s interpretation of the AKS, as any judicial narrowing of the interpretation could provide opportunities to develop innovative arrangements that may be beneficial to patients. Regardless, developing compliant arrangements to benefit patients can be complicated, and legal counsel can help to ensure you remain apprised of all relevant developments and assist in structuring compliant arrangements.

2. Litigation Developments

What Is the FCA Without Its Qui Player? A Look Into Zafirov’s Future Implications and the Enforceability of the FCA Without a Qui Tam Device

As we previously discussed, a Florida federal district court recently held in Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates LLC that the FCA qui tam provision is unconstitutional. The court reasoned that a relator who litigates an FCA lawsuit on behalf of the United States is not a properly appointed “officer” under Article II of the US Constitution and, thus, does not have the authority to serve in that position. This article examines several questions: What does FCA enforcement look like without a qui tam device? What questions did Zafirov leave unresolved? And what should one expect in the coming years as this issue is litigated on appeal and among other courts?

Can the government successfully enforce the FCA without a qui tam device? If, in the end, the qui tam provision is voided, that does not spell doom for the FCA. This is because the government still has the authority to file FCA actions itself and could hire many more attorneys to investigate and prosecute them. The government also has other mechanisms to entice whistleblowers to come out of the woodwork and inform it of wrongdoing. For example, recently, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the “Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program.” This enforcement program compensates whistleblowers who inform the DOJ of original and truthful information concerning corporate misconduct. If the information leads to a successful forfeiture of over $1 million, the whistleblower is compensated. Currently, however, the program does not cover FCA claims. But the DOJ or US Congress could theoretically expand this program, or create a new one, to attract whistleblowers who have information concerning FCA violations. Under such a program, the government’s litigation of FCA claims would not be all that different from what happens currently. Rather than intervene in a meritorious FCA case brought by a relator, the government would file its own case based on information provided by a whistleblower. This would avoid the constitutional pitfalls identified in Zafirov. A post-qui tam landscape will certainly see fewer FCA claims being filed overall, but the government would likely file more FCA claims than it does now.

Still, many questions remain unresolved under Zafirov concerning the extent to which relator suits are constitutionally permissible. In Zafirov, the relator was litigating an FCA suit in which the United States declined to intervene. But what happens if the United States does intervene and takes over the case? Are those suits permissible? Does the relator act as an “officer” if her role is just limited to filing a lawsuit? Could the government get around Zafirov by intervening in more cases? Or are all FCA lawsuits filed by a relator invalid ab initio even if the government intervenes? If so, would Congress have to create a mechanism to appoint a relator as an officer for FCA purposes? In short, it is unclear how broadly Zafirov will be read. On one hand, it could be read to only apply to non-intervened cases. On the other hand, the very act of filing a complaint on behalf of the United States may require a constitutional appointment, and the government’s intervention would not cure that taint. These questions will remain unresolved until they are addressed by the Supreme Court.

Only time will tell what will happen as this issue percolates in the courts. Already, several circuit courts have upheld the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions. In the district courts located in circuits that have not yet addressed this issue, defendants are filing dispositive motions arguing that the relator’s appointment is unconstitutional. Though the decision in Zafirov is currently an outlier, it soon may not be as more courts consider arguments that rely on Zafirov’s reasoning.

And the Fox Says… Zafirov is significant because it may be the first blow to a significant enforcement mechanism on which the government heavily relies. But the qui tam provision’s fate is not set in stone. The relator in Zafirov will almost certainly appeal the decision to the Atlanta-based Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. That court’s decision may then be appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeals process for Zafirov may take years before the Supreme Court grants certiorari on the issue (if it does at all). In the meantime, the issue is not going away, and Zafirov is unlikely to be a one-off case. Those who are in the throes of an FCA investigation or litigation should raise this issue as a possible litigation risk or as an affirmative defense. The best possible time to raise this issue amid litigation is on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Even if a case is past this point, Zafirov supports the position that such an argument is not waived, given that the issue goes to the relator’s very authority to bring the suit. So, defendants litigating a case brought by a relator should raise this issue as soon as possible. We at ArentFox Schiff will continue to monitor developments to help our clients navigate this ever-changing legal landscape.

3. Compliance Corner

AI Under the DOJ Microscope: How Health Care Companies Should Respond

Many companies, including health care companies, have incorporated artificial intelligence (AI) into their business practices. While historically, AI has largely been unregulated, that is starting to change. Recently, state governments have begun regulating the use of AI in the health care setting, as our colleagues summarized here regarding recently passed California legislation requiring health care facilities, clinics, and physician practices in the state to disclose the use of AI in communications regarding patient clinical information. Now, AI has the attention of the DOJ.

This past March, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco indicated the DOJ’s interest in AI, stating at the American Bar Association’s 39th National Institute on White Collar Crime that “fraud using AI is still fraud.” Following Monaco’s statement, in September, the Criminal Division of the DOJ updated its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) guidelines to require DOJ prosecutors to consider whether a company’s compliance program safeguards against misuse of AI or other emerging technologies. As a brief primer, the ECCP is a DOJ document that prosecutors use to evaluate the effectiveness of a corporate compliance program in determining whether to criminally charge a company. The document is published publicly and provides helpful insight into the DOJ’s expectations for companies as they build and implement their corporate compliance programs.

Under the updated guidance, the DOJ emphasizes that companies need to assess AI-related risks as part of their overall enterprise risk management systems. Specifically, a corporate compliance program must consider whether it has specific policies and procedures to prevent “any potential negative or unintended consequences” resulting from the use of AI in its business practices and compliance program. Additionally, a company should proactively conduct risk analyses of its use of AI and mitigate the potential for “deliberate or reckless misuse of technologies” by company insiders. Other key considerations are whether the company trains its employees on the use of AI, whether there is a baseline of human decision-making used to assess AI-generated content, and how the company implements accountability over the use of AI.

In its September update, the DOJ also revised a section of the ECCP, asking whether compliance personnel have access to relevant data sources to allow for “timely and effective monitoring and/or testing” of policies, controls, and transactions. A key consideration is whether the assets, resources, and technology available to compliance programs are comparable to those available elsewhere in the company. An imbalance in access to technology and resources may indicate a compliance program’s inability to detect and mitigate risks, particularly if a business unit is given unfettered access to AI tools while compliance lags behind.

Compliance officers at health care companies should take steps now to ensure that the implementation and use of AI within their organizations do not raise any compliance red flags. Consider the recent Texas Attorney General settlement with Pieces Technologies, a company that markets generative AI products, which resolved allegations that the company made misleading statements regarding the accuracy of its products. As part of the settlement, Pieces agreed to provide more explicit disclosures to customers related to how the company’s products should be used and the potential harm that could result from the products.

Providers using such technologies may encounter data privacy and security risks, including cybersecurity risks such as ransomware and malware attacks, bias and fairness concerns with respect to the training of the AI systems that may result in preference for a particular drug or treatment, and reliability and accountability concerns affecting a health care professional’s ability to provide patient care. With that being said, the DOJ could conduct investigations similar to the Pieces investigation against health care providers that use AI without considering these risks.

To help mitigate the risks associated with AI, including in the event of a DOJ investigation, compliance officers should be involved during all stages of discussions around AI initiatives, including through implementation and use. Compliance officers should ensure their companies have appropriate policies and procedures governing the use of AI once it is introduced to their organizations and provide training to employees both on the AI technology and on the policies governing its use. Finally, compliance officers should ensure they have the necessary access to AI systems to conduct compliance oversight measures. Such oversight measures may include assessing AI-related risks as part of their organization’s annual risk assessment, conducting AI-related auditing, and monitoring to help identify potential issues with the technology as they arise.

And the Fox Says… The DOJ’s AI-focused compliance guidance is a call to action for companies to proactively address the legal and regulatory implications of AI technologies, reminding them that the age of AI requires more than just innovation — it demands robust compliance strategies. Companies that conduct regular risk assessments of their practices must consider the use of AI, update policies and procedures to address its use, provide compliance teams with equal data access, and regularly update training on the lawful use of these technologies. Empowering compliance personnel and working with outside compliance experts to make these regular updates will put a company in a good position to meet these new standards. By embracing these guidelines, companies can mitigate legal and regulatory risks while leveraging the capabilities of AI technologies.

4. In Case You Missed It

Our most popular blog post from the last quarter: Federal Court Permits Investors to Resume Kickback Suit Against Teva.